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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
We are here asked to review a decision of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands in an appeal from an order of a 
bankruptcy judge sitting in the Virgin Islands by 
designation of the Third Circuit Judicial Council under 28 
U.S.C. S 155. The district court held that section 155 does 
not authorize the Council to transfer bankruptcy judges 
temporarily to the Virgin Islands. It concluded that the 
order appealed from was thus entered without authority 
and was invalid. We will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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I. 
 
Section 155 of Title 28 of the United States Code 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
        (a) A bankruptcy judge may be transferred to serve 
       temporarily as a bankruptcy judge in any judicial 
       district other than the judicial district for which such 
       bankruptcy judge was appointed upon the approval of 
       the judicial council of each of the circuits involved. 
 
        (b) A bankruptcy judge who has retired may, upon 
       consent, be recalled to serve as a bankruptcy judge in 
       any judicial district by the judicial council of the circuit 
       within which such district is located. 
 
The Honorable Joseph L. Cosetti is a retired bankruptcy 
judge of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania. On August 13, 1996, an order was 
entered by the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit 
memorializing its determination that there was an unmet 
need for the services of a bankruptcy judge in the Virgin 
Islands and recalling Judge Cosetti, pursuant to S 155(b), to 
meet that need.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There are two authorized district judge seats in the District of the 
Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. S 1614. A retirement in October of 1988 
resulted in the district's having only one resident judge for the ensuing 
14 months. Diane Russell, Some Ethical Considerations of Judicial 
Vacancies: A Case Study of the Federal Court System in the United States 
Virgin Islands, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 697, 697-98 (1992) (reprinted in 
138 Cong. Rec. H8313). The death of the remaining judge in December 
of 1989 was followed by a period of two and one-half years during which 
there was no resident judge in the district. Id. The two incumbent 
district judges were sworn in on June 30, 1992, and May 9, 1994, 
respectively. See 981 F. Supp. at XII. During the two years between their 
investitures, the district was served by only one resident judge. Thus, 
the district was severely understaffed for a period of over five and a 
half 
years. In these circumstances, the development of a backlog was 
inevitable; intolerable delays were threatened. 
 
The Judicial Council of the Third Circuit dealt with this crisis by 
transferring judges from other districts to help service the Virgin 
Islands 
workload. District judges from elsewhere in the Third Circuit and beyond 
were transferred under 28 U.S.C. S 292. In addition, beginning on April 
1, 1990, a New Jersey bankruptcy judge was transferred pursuant to 28 
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Jaritz Industries, Ltd. ("Jaritz"), a printing and copying 
business, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands. The case was referred to Judge 
Cosetti pursuant to the district court's standing order of 
reference. Joel Urice, the owner of Jaritz, had purchased 
the business from Vickers Associates, Ltd. ("Vickers") in 
return for an 8-year note that called for two large balloon 
payments at the end of the term. Jaritz sought bankruptcy 
protection primarily due to its inability to make the first of 
these balloon payments to Vickers. 
 
Several months after the bankruptcy proceedings began, 
A. Jeffrey Weiss entered an appearance as counsel for 
Vickers. Over the next few months, Weiss filed numerous 
frivolous and duplicitous motions and appeals, and his 
unprofessional conduct ultimately resulted in the entry of a 
sanction order by Judge Cosetti. On appeal, the district 
court sustained Judge Cosetti's order sanctioning Weiss 
and Vickers, and then directed Weiss and Vickers to show 
cause why the district court should not invoke its inherent 
power to impose additional sanctions for their conduct 
during the appeal. 
 
Prior to the return date of the order to show cause, the 
district court sua sponte raised and requested briefing on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
U.S.C. S 155(a). Judge Cosetti relieved him in January of 1992. Following 
Judge Cosetti's retirement in 1994, he was recalled under 28 U.S.C. 
S 155(b) for duty in the Virgin Islands, the District of New Jersey, the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. His authority to sit in the Virgin Islands was continued 
through two subsequent recalls. 
 
This transfer program has been successful. On December 31, 1989, 
there were 1400 civil cases, 395 criminal cases, and 209 bankruptcy 
cases pending in the District Court of the Virgin Islands. Administrative 
Office of the United States, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics 26, 36, 
58 (Dec. 31, 1990). By March 31, 1996, several months before the order 
issued in this case, there were 873 civil cases, 164 criminal cases, and 
137 bankruptcy cases pending in the district. Administrative Office of 
the United States, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 31, 52, 100 (Mar. 
31, 1996). While the backlog had been substantially reduced, the two 
district judges still had a substantial need for assistance with the 
bankruptcy workload. 
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the issue of its jurisdiction to hear appeals from orders of 
a U.S. bankruptcy judge under 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). The 
court ultimately concluded that it had "jurisdiction to 
review the order of a bankruptcy judge who would be 
properly authorized by statute to act as a judicial officer of 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands." In re Jaritz Indus., 
207 B.R. 451, 453 (D.V.I. 1997). The court held, however, 
that section 155 authorizes temporary transferring of 
bankruptcy judges only to Article III district courts, that 
Judge Cosetti accordingly lacked authority to sit on the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, an Article I court, and 
that "there simply [was] no such valid order to review in 
this case." Id. The district court viewed Judge Cosetti's lack 
of authority as depriving it of subject matter jurisdiction 
and dismissed the appeal. Shortly thereafter, the court 
entered an order withdrawing its standing order of 
reference. Jaritz timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 1294(3). The issue in 
this appeal is a question of law over which this court 
exercises plenary review. Epstein Family Partnership v. 
Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
II. 
 
Bankruptcy Judge Cosetti imposed sanctions on Vickers 
and Weiss pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011, which 
provides for sanctions parallel to those specified in Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 11. In Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992), 
the Supreme Court held that a district court has 
jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions on litigants and 
attorneys appearing before it even if the court is 
subsequently determined to lack subject matter jurisdiction 
over the case in which the sanctionable conduct occurred. 
While acknowledging that "[a] final determination of lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction of a case in a federal court, of 
course, precludes further adjudication of it," the Court 
nonetheless clarified that "such a determination does not 
automatically wipe out all proceedings had in the district 
court at a time when the district court operated under the 
misapprehension that it had jurisdiction." Id. at 137. 
 
The Court explained that "maintenance of orderly 
procedure" provided sufficient grounds to justify an 
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imposition of non-case dispositive sanctions "even in the 
wake of a jurisdiction ruling later found to be mistaken." Id. 
Although parties may eventually seek appellate review of a 
court's invocation of jurisdiction over their dispute, they are 
required to demean themselves appropriately before that 
court while awaiting that appeal: 
 
        The interest in having rules of procedure obeyed. . . 
       does not disappear upon a subsequent determination 
       that the court was without subject-matter jurisdiction. 
       Courts do make mistakes . . . . But . . . there is no 
       constitutional infirmity under Article III in requiring 
       those practicing before the courts to conduct 
       themselves in compliance with the applicable 
       procedural rules in the interim, and to allow the courts 
       to impose Rule 11 sanctions in the event of their 
       failure to do so. 
 
Id. at 139. 
 
We recognize that the validity of Judge Cosetti's sanction 
orders poses a somewhat different issue than that posed in 
Willy. The authority of the sanctioning judge to sit in his 
district was not challenged in Willy. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the principles found controlling in Willy must 
control here. Judge Cosetti was a duly appointed judge with 
the authority to exercise the judicial power of the United 
States in bankruptcy matters. He was sitting in the District 
of the Virgin Islands, rather than his home district, 
pursuant to a duly adopted resolution of the Judicial 
Council of the Third Circuit. He exercised judicial power 
over this particular controversy by virtue of a standing 
order of the district court and without protest from Vickers 
or Weiss. Both he and the litigants had a substantial 
interest in the proceedings being conducted in an orderly 
manner. Just as in Willy, Judge Cosetti's and the litigants' 
interests in having rules of procedure obeyed did not 
disappear upon the subsequent determination of the 
district court that Judge Cosetti lacked jurisdiction. By the 
same token, Vickers and Weiss were and are obligated to 
conduct themselves appropriately in these proceedings 
unless and until it is finally determined that the apparent 
authority of Judge Cosetti is invalid. 
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It follows that the district court was in error when it 
concluded that Judge Cosetti's sanction order was invalid 
because it was issued without jurisdiction. It also follows, 
in our view, that the district court had appellate 
jurisdiction to review that order and that any sanctions 
which the district judge might have imposed as a result of 
improper conduct during the appellate proceedings would 
have to be sustained by us without reference to our 
determination regarding the validity of the Circuit Council's 
transfer order. See In re Orthopedic "Bone Screw" Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Under normal circumstances, we would conclude our 
analysis here. The foregoing discussion therefore provides 
adequate support for our mandate. Nonetheless, the district 
court's opinion expresses the view that any bankruptcy 
judge transferred to the Virgin Islands by the Circuit 
Council lacks authority to adjudicate any bankruptcy 
matters there, and this view has resulted in the withdrawal 
of the district's standing order of reference. This has 
substantially burdened the administration of bankruptcy in 
the Virgin Islands. Because the issue is of such significance 
and the parties have briefed it extensively, we pursue our 
discussion of whether Judge Cosetti was properly 
authorized to hear bankruptcy matters in the Virgin 
Islands. 
 
III. 
 
The specific issue for decision here is a narrow one: what 
did Congress intend when it used the term "judicial 
district" in section 155. Did it use the term in a generic 
sense to refer to the geographic area in which a district 
court exercises judicial authority in bankruptcy matters, or 
did it intend its scope to be limited to the geographic area 
in which an Article III district court exercises judicial 
authority over such matters. If Congress intended the 
former, section 155 authorizes transfers of bankruptcy 
judges to serve in the district in which the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands exercises bankruptcy jurisdiction. If 
Congress intended the latter, section 155 provides no such 
authority. 
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The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 
of 1984 effected a comprehensive reorganization of our 
bankruptcy system in the wake of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50 (1982), finding the jurisdictional 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
unconstitutional. Chapter 6 of Title 28, as amended by the 
1984 Act, specifies the character and operation of the 
reorganized system. The transfers authorized by section 
155 are an integral part of that Chapter and of that 
reorganized system. 
 
We find nothing in the text of section 155 that limits its 
scope to judicial districts having an Article III district court. 
Similarly, we find nothing in the text of Chapter 6 that, as 
a matter of textual analysis, so limits the scope of that 
section. Finally, we find nothing in the very sparse 
legislative history of the 1984 Act that suggests an intent to 
restrict the authorization conferred by section 155 to Article 
III districts. Thus, consideration of the text and legislative 
history of Chapter 6 alone would tend to support the view 
that "judicial district" was intended to include any district 
in which judicial authority over bankruptcy matters is 
exercised. We would, of course, be remiss however if we 
decided this statutory construction issue without 
considering the purpose of section 155 and its place in the 
scheme of Chapter 6. Accordingly, we inquire whether the 
broader or the narrower reading of "judicial district" will 
best serve Congress's objectives in enacting Chapter 6 and 
section 155 in particular. 
 
The overall objective of Chapter 6 was to create a 
reorganized bankruptcy system in which a specialized corps 
of full-time bankruptcy judges would assist district court 
judges in adjudicating bankruptcy matters in a manner 
consistent with the teachings of Marathon. It is evident 
from the face of section 155 that its objective was the 
efficient and effective use of that corps of full-time 
bankruptcy judges. Congress was aware from past 
experience that the demand for bankruptcy services in any 
given district would ebb and flow in response to the 
economic conditions in the district, and that the supply of 
judge power in each district to provide such services would 
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ebb and flow depending on such things as the number of 
district judge and bankruptcy judge vacancies. Moreover, 
Congress determined not to provide the new system with 
part-time bankruptcy judges, and it must have been aware 
that there would be periods when the bankruptcy workload 
in a district would be substantial enough to be difficult to 
service, but nevertheless not yet large enough to warrant 
the appointment of a full-time bankruptcy judge. In this 
context, the new system would be efficient and effective 
only if someone were given the authority to match demand 
with judge power by transferring bankruptcy judges to 
districts where the regularly assigned judicial officers were 
overloaded. This matching authority was appropriately 
conferred on the judicial councils of the circuits, which had 
earlier been directed to "make all necessary and 
appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious 
administration of justice within [their circuits]." 28 U.S.C. 
S 332(d)(1). 
 
Having identified the evident purpose of section 155, we 
turn to the overall statutory scheme of Chapter 6 to 
determine if there is any reason Congress might have 
wished to garner the efficiencies provided by that section 
for judicial districts having an Article III district court and 
not for judicial districts having an Article I district court 
which exercises the jurisdiction of an Article III court by 
virtue of the legislation that created it. We perceive no such 
reason. To the contrary, our review of the statutory scheme 
has convinced us that Congress intended the new 
bankruptcy system to operate in the Virgin Islands in the 
same manner it was to operate in an Article III district 
under comparable circumstances. 
 
Under the new system, the district courts retained their 
original subject matter jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases. 
This included both district courts created by Congress 
under Article III of the Constitution as well as territorial 
courts created by Congress under Article I which, like the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, were authorized to 
exercise the subject matter jurisdiction of Article III district 
courts. Thus, the judges of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, like all United States district judges, are authorized 
to adjudicate bankruptcy cases. 
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As we have noted, the 1984 Act created a corps of full- 
time bankruptcy judges to assist district judges with the 
bankruptcy workload. These judges were to be appointed in 
the manner set forth in 28 U.S.C. S 152. Subsections 
152(a)(1) and (2) reflect a determination by Congress that 
the then current bankruptcy workload of each Article III 
district court justified one or more full-time bankruptcy 
judges. They establish the number of bankruptcy judge 
seats for each such district and direct that the judgeships 
thus authorized be filled by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Subsection 152(a)(4), on 
the other hand, reflects a determination by Congress that 
the bankruptcy workload of the territorial district courts 
did not yet warrant a full-time bankruptcy judge in any 
such district. 
 
Most importantly for present purposes, however, 
subsection 152(a)(4) also reflects an anticipation on the 
part of Congress that this situation would change and that 
full-time bankruptcy judges would be needed in one or 
more of the Article I courts in the future. Subsection 
152(a)(4) directs that the district judges of the territorial 
courts will handle the bankruptcy work for the present but 
goes on to authorize the United States Court of Appeals for 
the circuit within which a territorial district court is located 
to fill full-time bankruptcy seats for the judicial district as 
they are created by Congress. Finally, subsection 152(b)(2) 
directs that the Judicial Conference monitor the need for 
full-time bankruptcy judges and periodically submit to 
Congress its recommendations "regarding the number of 
bankruptcy judges needed and the districts in which such 
judges are needed." In this way, Congress would be in a 
position, when the need arose, to increase the number of 
full-time bankruptcy judge seats in Article III districts as 
well as to create new full-time bankruptcy seats in the 
Article I districts. 
 
Section 157 of the Act, which spells out the jurisdiction 
of bankruptcy judges and their relationships to the judges 
of the district courts, is not limited by its text to the Article 
III courts listed in subsection 152(a)(2). Rather, that text is 
drafted in such a way that once bankruptcy judges are 
available to assist the judges of a district court of a 
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territory, the system will work in the same fashion in that 
district as in other districts with initially authorized 
bankruptcy judge seats. Section 157(a), for example, 
stipulates that "[e]ach district court may provide that any 
or all cases [, arising under, arising in, or related to a case 
under] title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges 
for the district." It was this provision under which the 
district court of the Virgin Islands entered its general order 
of reference. We believe that order was fully consistent with 
the wording and intent of section 157. 
 
Finally, note should be taken of section 158, which 
governs appeals from final and interlocutory orders of 
bankruptcy judges in proceedings referred to them under 
section 157. With one exception not here relevant, section 
158 provides that "[t]he district courts of the United States 
shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final. . . orders 
. . . and with leave of the court, from . . . interlocutory 
orders . . . of bankruptcy judges," and that an appeal to a 
circuit court is permissible only after that jurisdiction has 
been exercised. In In re Kool, Mann, Coffee & Co., 23 F.3d 
66 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that, because the district court 
of the Virgin Islands exercises all of the jurisdiction of a 
district court of the United States under 48 U.S.C. 
S 1612(a), section 158(a) applies to orders of a bankruptcy 
judge sitting in its judicial district and forecloses an appeal 
from such an order directly to this court. Implicit in our 
decision in Kool, Mann is the view that Congress 
anticipated that the new bankruptcy system would function 
in the Virgin Islands in the same way it would function in 
other judicial districts having Article III courts in 
comparable circumstances. 
 
Based on our review of Chapter 6 of Title 28, the 
following relevant propositions seem to us indisputable: (1) 
Congress intended bankruptcy matters to be adjudicated in 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands; (2) Congress 
determined that bankruptcy judges would assist the judges 
of that district when there was a sufficient workload to 
warrant a full-time bankruptcy judge, and the bankruptcy 
system would thereafter function in that district in the 
same manner as in Article III districts; and (3) Congress 
intended the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit to make 
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the most effective and efficient use of district judge and 
bankruptcy judge power in the circuit by temporarily 
transferring bankruptcy judges so as to match the need for 
bankruptcy services in a district with the judge power 
available there. The remaining issue is whether Congress 
intended to foreclose the Judicial Council of the Third 
Circuit from acting to meet an unserved need for 
bankruptcy services in the Virgin Islands by temporary 
transfer prior to the time when the bankruptcy workload is 
of sufficient size and consistency to warrant the creation of 
a full-time bankruptcy judge seat for the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands. Having considered this issue, we now 
make explicit what we believe is implicit in our decision in 
Kool, Mann: We conclude that the 1984 Act evidences no 
Congressional intent arbitrarily to defer the flexibility and 
thus the efficiency provided by section 155 in this manner. 
Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the district 
court's reading of that section. 
 
We have thus far confined our discussion to an analysis 
of the text and legislative history of the relevant portions of 
the 1984 Act. As we have indicated, that analysis supports 
the conclusion that "judicial district" in Section 155 
includes the judicial districts of Article I courts. As Weiss 
and Vickers stress, however, the relevant portions of the 
1984 Act have been codified as a part of Title 28 of the 
United States Code, and cognizance of that context should 
be taken when interpreting section 155. Section 451 of Title 
28 contains a set of definitions that apply to terms "[a]s 
used" throughout Title 28. Section 451 provides that the 
term "judicial district" as used in Title 28 refers to "the 
districts enumerated in Chapter 5" of Title 28, the chapter 
that creates Article III district courts. Section 451 can thus 
be cited in support of a conclusion that the authority 
conferred by section 155 is limited to transfers to judicial 
districts having Article III district courts. The definitions of 
section 451 were codified 36 years before the adoption of 
the 1984 Act, however, and are definitions for general 
application throughout all 53 chapters of Title 28. While 
we, of course, recognize that a definitional section like 
section 451 must presumptively be taken as reflecting the 
Congressional intent when a defined term is used even in 
subsequent legislation, it is not controlling where 
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consideration of the term's immediate context and its place 
in the overall Congressional scheme clearly indicate that it 
is being used not as a defined term of art but in its 
commonly understood sense. 
 
We find the situation before us much like that before the 
Supreme Court in International Longshoremen's & 
Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 
237 (1952). There, the ILWU had sued Juneau Spruce for 
alleged violations of the Labor Management Relations Act in 
the District Court for the Territory of Alaska. Section 303(b) 
of the LMRA authorized suit for violations of its provisions 
"in any district court of the United States." When it 
addressed the issue of the district court's jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he words `district 
court of the United States' commonly describe 
constitutional courts created under Article III of the 
Constitution, not the [Article I] courts of the Territories." Id. 
at 241. Indeed, those words were so defined at the time by 
section 451 of Title 28. The Court went on to suggest that 
there was another less common but permissible reading of 
those words, however, in the context of a district court, like 
the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, that is 
authorized to exercise the jurisdiction of an Article III court. 
The Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity by reference to 
the context in which the words were used and the purpose 
of the congressional scheme. 
 
The Court noted that the jurisdictional grant in section 
303(b) removed the jurisdictional limitations of amount in 
controversy and citizenship of the parties, defined the 
capacity of labor unions to sue or be sued, restricted the 
enforceability of money judgments against the assets of 
labor unions, specified the jurisdiction of district courts 
over unions, and defined the requirements of service of 
process. The Court reasoned that these provisions reflected 
Congress's design in passing the LMRA to reshape labor- 
management relations. Part of this design was to remove 
obstacles to suit in federal courts, and the District Court 
for the Territory of Alaska was the only court in Alaska with 
federal jurisdiction to which the Union could seek recourse. 
Id. at 242. The Court concluded as follows: 
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       [S]ince Congress lifted the restrictive requirements 
       which might preclude suit in courts having the district 
       courts' jurisdiction, we think it is more consonant with 
       the uniform, national policy of the Act to hold that 
       those restrictions were lifted as respects all courts 
       upon which the jurisdiction of a district court has been 
       conferred. That reading of the Act does not, to be sure, 
       take the words `district court of the United States' in 
       their historic, technical sense. But literalness is no 
       sure touchstone of legislative purpose. The purpose 
       here is more closely approximated, we believe, by giving 
       the historic phrase a looser, more liberal meaning in 
       the special context of this legislation. 
 
Id. at 242-43. 
 
We believe the teachings of Juneau Spruce counsel a 
liberal interpretation of section 155 based on its underlying 
context and purpose. Congress enacted a uniform, national 
policy of bankruptcy administration in the 1984 Act, and 
section 155 of that Act was designed to facilitate efficient 
use of judicial resources. Congress inserted section 155 
into the 1984 Act so that the circuit judicial councils could 
allocate bankruptcy judges among the "judicial districts" in 
which bankruptcy cases are adjudicated. Although the term 
"judicial district" as defined elsewhere in the Judicial Code 
refers only to the specifically enumerated district courts, 
the purpose of section 155 -- ensuring maximally efficient 
use of judicial resources -- is "more closely approximated" 
by a more pragmatic and flexible construction of that term. 
 
IV. 
 
Even if we were persuaded that section 451 limits the 
scope of section 155, and that the latter section, 
accordingly, does not reflect an affirmative decision by 
Congress to authorize temporary transfers of bankruptcy 
judges to judicial districts of Article I courts, our ultimate 
resolution of the issue before us would be the same. 
Section 332(d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code 
directs that "[e]ach judicial council shall make all necessary 
and appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious 
administration of justice within its circuit," and section 
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332(d)(2) orders that "[a]ll judicial officers and employees of 
the circuit shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the 
judicial council." The text of this provision and its 
legislative history convince us that it authorizes circuit 
councils to take any administrative action that will promote 
the effective and expeditious administration of justice in 
their circuits, so long as the action is not inconsistent with 
rules and policies Congress has previously established in 
statutes regulating the affairs of the federal judiciary. 
 
The temporary transfer of a duly appointed bankruptcy 
judge to a judicial district of an Article I court to service the 
bankruptcy workload in that district is clearly an 
administrative action designed to promote the effective and 
expeditious administration of justice in the circuit. Given 
our previously stated conclusions that Congress (1) has 
determined in 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a) that bankruptcy cases 
will be adjudicated in the Virgin Islands, (2) has approved 
in section 152(a)(4) the use of bankruptcy judges to assist 
the district judges of the Virgin Islands in servicing the 
bankruptcy load, and (3) has endorsed in section 155(a) a 
policy favoring temporary transfer of bankruptcy judges to 
match the demand for bankruptcy services with available 
judge power, we conclude that Judge Cosetti's transfer to 
the Virgin Islands by the Third Circuit Judicial Council was 
authorized by 28 U.S.C. S 332(d). 
 
It is apparent from the text of section 332(d) and from its 
legislative history that it was intended to charge circuit 
councils with the responsibility of assuring the prompt and 
efficient administration of justice in their circuits. This 
charge included an express mandate that they were to 
initiate any and all actions necessary to provide that 
assurance. The authority conferred was neither restricted 
nor discretionary. That authority was clearly broad enough 
to encompass the action taken by the Circuit Council here. 
 
The Honorable Emanuel Celler was a member of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary when section 332(d) was 
debated and enacted in 1939. Two decades later, as 
Chairman of that Committee, he had occasion to canvass 
and comment upon the relevant legislative history of that 
provision and the ensuing experience of his Committee. 
Judicial Conference of the United States Report on the 
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Powers and Responsibilities of the Judicial Councils, H.R. 
Doc. No. 87-201, at v-vi (1961). Chairman Celler 
characterized S 332(d) as conferring on the circuit councils 
"all-inclusive responsibility for court management and 
judicial administration." Id. at v. He went on to make the 
following observations concerning the legislative intent: 
 
       . . . [I]t was the intention of the Congress to charge the 
       judicial councils of the circuits with the responsibility 
       for doing all and whatever was necessary of an 
       administrative character to maintain efficiency and 
       public confidence in the administration of justice. . . . 
 
        The language of title 28, United States Code, section 
       332 was recommended to the Congress in 1939 by the 
       judges themselves and was deliberately worded in 
       broad terms in order to confer broad responsibility and 
       authority on the judicial councils. It was the 
       considered judgment of the Congress that the judicial 
       councils were by their very nature the proper agents 
       for supervising management and administration of the 
       Federal courts. The councils are close to all the courts 
       of the circuit and know their needs better than anyone 
       else and, by placing responsibility and authority in the 
       councils of the circuits, administrative power in the 
       judicial branch was decentralized, as it ought to be, 
       and in each circuit kept in the hands of judges of the 
       circuit. 
 
       * * * 
 
        In past years many problems have been called to the 
       attention of the Committee on the Judiciary which, in 
       my judgment, should have been settled by the judicial 
       council of the circuit and need never have been 
       brought to the attention of the Congress if the judicial 
       council had met the responsibility and exercised the 
       powers conferred upon it by the Congress. I will 
       mention only one example. 
 
        The Congress is not infrequently importuned to 
       create additional judicial districts and divisions. Most 
       of these demands originate from inadequate judicial 
       service in the localities concerned. Nearly all of them 
       could and should be remedied by action of the judicial 
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       council of the circuit in arranging and planning judicial 
       assignments to provide an equitable distribution of the 
       judgepower of the circuit. 
 
As these remarks suggest, the primary criticism of the 
courts that had been brought to the attention of Congress 
in 1939 concerned delay in the administration of justice. 
See S. Rep. No. 76-426, at 2-4 (1939). One of the responses 
that Congress expressly expected the new judicial councils 
to adopt was the matching of need for judicial services and 
judge power through inter-district assignment. In his 
concurrence in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth 
Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), Justice Harlan undertakes an 
exhaustive analysis of the legislative background of section 
332. Quoting the testimony of Chief Justice Groner, who 
"shouldered most of the task of explaining the purposes of 
the bill to the committees of both Houses of Congress," id. 
at 99, Justice Harlan observes that section 332 was 
designed to empower the judicial councils to take a variety 
of ameliorative actions, including "if the statistics showed a 
particular district court to be falling behind in its work, 
[action by] the Council [to] `see to it . . . that assistance is 
given to him whereby the work may be made current.' " Id. 
at 100 (quoting Hearings on S.188 before a Subcomm. of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 11 (1939)). 
Circuit Judge Parker testified similarly before the House 
Judiciary Committee, predicting that the councils could 
explain to districts whose dockets had fallen into arrears 
that they "will send Judge Smith into your district and he 
will assist you in holding court in your district until this 
arrearage is cleared up." Id. at 100 n. 7 (quoting Hearings 
on H.R. 5999 before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
76th Cong. 20-21 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The current provision authorizing inter-district transfers of district 
judges, 28 U.S.C. S 292, was not in existence in 1939. Section 17 of Title 
28 of the United States Code of 1927, as it existed in 1939, provided: 
 
       Whenever any district judge by reason of any disability or 
necessary 
       absence from his district or the accumulation or urgency of 
       business is unable to perform speedily the work of his district, 
the 
       senior circuit judge of that circuit, or, in his absence, the 
circuit 
       justice thereof, may, if in his judgment the public interest 
requires, 
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We believe these portions of the legislative history 
demonstrate that when the Third Circuit Judicial Council 
entered its order temporarily transferring Judge Cosetti to 
the Virgin Islands to assist with the bankruptcy workload 
there, it was doing precisely what Congress intended to 
authorize and require when it adopted S 332(d). In the 
words of Chairman Celler, it was "arranging and planning 
judicial assignments to provide an equitable distribution of 
the judgepower of the circuit." Thus, even were we 
persuaded that section 155 did not affirmatively authorize 
Judge Cosetti's transfer, we would sustain his authority to 
sit in the Virgin Islands under section 322(d). 
 
V. 
 
The order of the district court dismissing the appeal 
before it for want of jurisdiction will be reversed, and this 
matter will be remanded to the district court so that it may 
affirm Judge Cosetti's sanction order and determine 
whether additional sanctions are appropriate based on 
conduct occurring before it during the appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
designate and assign any district judge of any district court within 
the same judicial circuit to act as district judge in such district and 
to discharge all the judicial duties of a judge thereof for such time 
as the business of the said district court may require. 
 
Section 332(d) was viewed as supplementing the authority thus 
conferred. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, joining in Parts I, II, and IV of the 
majority's opinion and concurring in the result. 
 
Were I a member of Congress, I would willingly vote to 
support a statute with the provisions that my colleagues 
read into section 155 of title 28. But I do not join Part III 
of Judge Stapleton's opinion because we have the obligation 
to construe the text of a statute according to its terms, even 
if we believe that it is likely that Congress made an 
inadvertent omission. This is particularly so when the 
language of the statute literally applied, reaches a coherent, 
albeit undesired, result. Like the district court, I 
"reluctantly" must conclude that the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 does not 
authorize the temporary transfer of bankruptcy judges to 
the district courts of the Virgin Islands. 
 
The relevant statutory language provides that "[a] 
bankruptcy judge may be transferred to serve temporarily 
as a bankruptcy judge in any judicial district other than the 
judicial district for which such bankruptcy judge was 
appointed. . . ." 28 U.S.C. S 155(a) (emphasis added). Both 
the majority and the district court have correctly framed 
the statutory question as "what did Congress intend when 
it used the term `judicial district' in section 155." Maj. op. 
at 7. And as both the district court and the majority have 
recognized, that term is expressly defined. Section 451 of 
title 28 provides that "[a]s used in this title . . . [t]he term 
`district' and `judicial district' mean the districts enumerated 
in Chapter 5 of this title." 28 U.S.C. S 451 (emphasis added). 
In turn, chapter 5 of title 28 creates 91 enumerated judicial 
districts, including one for the District of Puerto Rico, but 
not for the Virgin Islands. See 28 U.S.C. SS 81-131. 
 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that 
 
       in interpreting a statute a court should always turn 
       first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have 
       stated time and again that courts must presume that 
       a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
       means in a statute what it says there. When the words 
       of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is 
       also the last: "judicial inquiry is complete." 
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Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 
(1992) (citations omitted) (declining to adopt interpretation 
of section of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 that was inconsistent with pre- 
existing section of title 28). The text at issue before us 
admits of no ambiguity. Accordingly, we must assume that 
Congress meant for the term "judicial district" in section 
155 to refer only to those districts enumerated in chapter 
5 of title 28. Because the Virgin Islands is not one of those 
districts, I am compelled to conclude that section 155 does 
not authorize the temporary transfer of a bankruptcy judge 
to the Virgin Islands. 
 
The majority does not purport to have discovered an 
ambiguity in any of the statutes relevant to its decision. 
Rather, they contend that the definitions contained in 
section 451 are not controlling as they only "presumptively" 
reflect congressional intent. Significantly, the only authority 
that the majority cites in support of its interpretive 
technique is International Longshoremen's & 
Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 
237 (1952). There, the Court was called upon to determine 
whether the phrase "district court of the United States" as 
used in section 303(b) of the LMRA included the then- 
territorial court of Alaska. After noting that the phrase 
"district court of the United States" "commonly describe[s] 
constitutional courts created under Article III of the 
Constitution" as opposed to the territorial courts, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that the context and purpose of 
the LMRA required a broader definition. Id. at 241 
(emphasis added). Significantly, the language at issue there 
was not defined in the LMRA nor was it subject to the 
definitional sections of title 28. Thus, with no explicit 
direction from Congress, the Court declined to apply the 
"historic" definition of the phrase "district court of the 
United States" and, instead, adopted one more in keeping 
with the national policy underlying the LMRA. Id. at 243. 
 
In contrast, Congress has expressly defined the term 
"judicial district" as it appears in section 155 and elsewhere 
throughout title 28. As such, we are not at liberty, as was 
the Court in Juneau Spruce, to fashion a definition which, 
in this court's view, better serves the legislative purpose. 
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Where Congress has made its intention explicit in the text 
of the statute, we are bound to follow its clear instruction. 
It is pure conjecture for the majority to presume that 
Congress did not realize that by placing section 155 within 
title 28 it would be subject to that title's definitional 
provisions. 
 
Of course, I agree with the majority that one of the 
purposes underlying the 1984 Act was "to facilitate efficient 
use of judicial resources." Maj. op. at 14. It does not follow 
that Congress intended to enact every provision that would 
enhance judicial efficiency. Admittedly, one of Congress's 
overarching objectives was to facilitate the efficient 
distribution of judicial resources, but the unambiguous 
means by which Congress chose to advance that objective 
was to authorize the temporary transfer of bankruptcy 
judges to the 91 "judicial districts" enumerated in chapter 
5 of title 28. Our belief that other transfers would also 
facilitate efficient use of judicial resources cannot drive our 
analysis. 
 
I conclude, therefore, that section 155 did not authorize 
the transfer of Judge Cosetti to the Virgin Islands. As such 
I cannot join in Part III of the majority's opinion. 
 
I do, however, agree with the majority that 28 U.S.C. 
S 332(d)(1) invested the Judicial Council with the authority 
to effect the transfer. Thus, to the extent that I, in my 
capacity as Chief Judge of the Third Circuit, signed the 
orders on behalf of the Judicial Council designating and 
assigning Judge Cosetti to the District of the Virgin Islands 
under the authority of 28 U.S.C. S 155(a), repeating the 
language used by my predecessor in entering similar 
orders, I believe I erred in the statutory reference, although 
I believe that the Judicial Council clearly had the authority 
to assign Judge Cosetti under 28 U.S.C. S 332(d)(1), given 
the need for his service. Accordingly, I concur in the 
judgment of the court. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
While I agree with the general principles expounded by 
the majority and the majority's ultimate resolution of the 
issues presented, I write separately to clarify what for me 
are the essential policy considerations that weigh in favor of 
the result reached. 
 
I. 
 
The central issue we are called upon to decide is whether 
the temporary transfer provision of the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA"), 
confers upon the Third Circuit Judicial Council the 
authority to assign a United States bankruptcy judge 
temporarily to the United States District Court for the 
District of the Virgin Islands. Specifically, we must 
determine whether Congress intended the term "judicial 
district" as used in section 155(a) of the BAFJA to include 
territorial districts such as the Virgin Islands.1 
 
A. 
 
Our starting point, as with any case construing a statute, 
is the language of the statute itself. Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 846 (1997); International Primate 
Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 
500 U.S. 72, 79 (1991). As always, we interpret the 
language of the BAFJA by reference to the language itself, 
the specific context in which the language is used, and the 
broader context of the BAFJA as a whole. Robinson, 117 S. 
Ct. at 846. In addition, we interpret the BAFJA in a manner 
which best effectuates Congressional intent and the 
legislative purpose underlying its adoption. International 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 155(a) of the BAFJA provides as follows: 
 
       A bankruptcy judge many be transferred to serve temporarily as a 
       bankruptcy judge in any judicial district other than the judicial 
       district for which such bankruptcy judge was appointed upon the 
       approval of the judicial council of each of the circuits involved. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 155 (a)(1994)(emphasis added). 
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Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce 
Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 241-43 (1952). 
 
As noted by the majority, the BAFJA was enacted to 
respond to the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
U.S. 50 (1982), holding that Congress' broad grant of 
jurisdiction to non-Article III bankruptcy judges was 
unconstitutional. In July 1984, Congress passed the BAFJA 
in order to create a nationwide, comprehensive judicial 
bankruptcy system that complied with Northern Pipeline. 
 
In the interim period between Northern Pipeline and the 
enactment of the BAFJA, the courts enacted emergency 
rules that complied with Northern Pipeline to govern the 
operation of the bankruptcy courts until Congress acted. 
See Jean K. FitzSimon and Andrea J. Winkler, Legislative 
History of the Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984, Collier on Bankruptcy, App. Vol. E, Pt. 6-87, 6- 
99 (15th ed. 1997). The emergency rules were held to be 
justified in order to avoid inundating the district courts 
with bankruptcy cases when an entire system of 
bankruptcy judges with specialized knowledge and 
expertise was already in place. In re Stewart, 741 F.2d 127, 
132 n.6 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 
In upholding the constitutionality of one such emergency 
rule, our sister court of appeals for the Second Circuit 
offered the following insight into the purpose and policy 
behind establishing bankruptcy courts: 
 
       There are also strong policy reasons for allowing 
       bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments in 
       traditional bankruptcy disputes. First, the practice 
       eliminates the need for the district courts to enter 
       every bankruptcy case at the beginning. District courts 
       are thus free to attend to other matters on their 
       crowded calendars, giving all litigants a better 
       opportunity to have their day in court. Second, all 
       cases are not appealed. There should be at least one 
       adjudication made by a judge with expertise in 
       bankruptcy law. 
 
In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1581 (2d Cir. 1983). The 
BAFJA enacted by Congress in 1984 was based largely 
upon the emergency rules adopted by the courts. 
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B. 
 
Section 152(a) of the BAFJA provides for the appointment 
of numerous bankruptcy judges for the "several judicial 
districts" in the states listed in section 152(a)(2). In 
addition, the BAFJA includes the following provision 
relating to the establishment of bankruptcy judges in 
territories such as the Virgin Islands: 
 
       The judges of the district courts for the territories shall 
       serve as the bankruptcy judges for such courts. The 
       United States court of appeals for the circuit within 
       which such a territorial district court is located may 
       appoint bankruptcy judges under this chapter for such 
       district if authorized to do so by the Congress of the 
       United States under this section. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 152 (a)(4)(1994). We have not appointed a 
bankruptcy judge to the Virgin Islands under this provision 
because Congress has yet to authorize such an 
appointment. 
 
As the initial BAFJA provision establishing a bankruptcy 
system for the territories, section 152(a)(4) is central to our 
analysis of whether Congress intended the term "judicial 
district" to encompass the Virgin Islands. By using the 
phrase "for such district" in this section, Congress 
expressed its intention to include the territories when 
employing the term "district." Because the terms "district" 
and "judicial district" are used interchangeably within the 
BAFJA and because the word "judicial" has no limiting 
connotation in connection with courts in the territories, 
Congress' clear expression that the term "district" includes 
the Virgin Islands extends equally to the term "judicial 
district." See generally 28 U.S.C. S 156 (1994)(discussing 
appointment of law clerks for bankruptcy judges and using 
the term "district" in section 156(f) and"judicial district" in 
section 156(e) interchangeably).2 
 
This interpretation of the terms "judicial district" and 
"district" is consistent with their use in the BAFJA as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The fact that Congress has traditionally defined the terms "district" 
and "judicial district" as synonyms further supports this conclusion. See 
28 U.S.C. S 451 (1994). 
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whole. If Congress were to authorize and we were to 
appoint a bankruptcy judge to the Virgin Islands as 
contemplated by section 152(a)(4), only our interpretation of 
these terms would give the statute the meaning Congress 
intended. For example, section 158 which governs appeals 
from bankruptcy judge decisions provides that appeals 
"shall only be taken to the district court for the judicial 
district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving." This 
section contemplates that a decision by a duly authorized 
and appointed Virgin Islands bankruptcy judge may only be 
appealed to the District Court of the Virgin Islands. See In 
re Kool, Mann, Coffee & Co., 23 F.3d 66, 67-68 (3d Cir. 
1994)(holding that section 158 requires that an appeal from 
a bankruptcy judge sitting by designation in the Virgin 
Islands must be taken to the district court). 
 
If we were to interpret the term "judicial district" as 
excluding the Virgin Islands, the BAFJA would contain no 
provision to govern direct appeals from a Virgin Islands 
bankruptcy judge. In light of the fact that Congress 
undisputedly contemplated the future appointment of such 
a judge, it is inconceivable that Congress would provide no 
provision to appeal from that judge's decisions. This is 
especially true given that the BAFJA was adopted to 
address Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court decision that 
curtailed Congress' former broad grant of jurisdiction to 
non-Article III bankruptcy judges. Section 158 therefore 
must include appeals from bankruptcy judges in the Virgin 
Islands, and, a fortiori, the term "judicial district" as used 
therein must include the Virgin Islands. See also 28 U.S.C. 
SS 154(a), 156, 157(a)(1994)(setting forth general provisions 
that would have no force in relation to a duly appointed 
Virgin Islands bankruptcy judge if the terms "district" and 
"judicial district" were meant to exclude the Virgin Islands). 
 
As noted by the majority, 28 U.S.C. S 451, may be cited 
as casting doubt upon our determination that the terms 
"judicial district" and "district" include the Virgin Islands. 
Section 451 defines those terms as "the districts 
enumerated in Chapter 5," i.e. districts containing only 
Article III courts. See 28 U.S.C. S 451 (1994). I agree with 
the majority, however, that this section is not controlling in 
light of the fact that it was codified 36 years prior to the 
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BAFJA and because this definition does not comport with 
the logical meaning of the terms as used in the BAFJA. See, 
e.g., Juneau Spruce, 342 U.S. at 241 (rejecting a historical 
definition also found in section 451 where that definition 
did not comport with the logical meaning of the term that 
best effectuated the purpose of the statute). At most, 
section 451 renders these terms facially ambiguous, an 
ambiguity that can be conclusively resolved by examining 
the legislative purpose behind adoption of the BAFJA. 
 
C. 
 
As the majority recognizes, the approach taken by the 
Court in International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's 
Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952), is 
particularly instructive to our analysis of the proper 
interpretation of the BAFJA in light of the legislative 
purpose underlying its adoption. In Juneau Spruce, the 
Court was faced with determining whether the District 
Court of the Territory of Alaska was a `district court of the 
United States' for purposes of conferring upon it 
jurisdiction for actions brought under the Labor 
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Juneau Spruce, 342 
U.S. at 240. While the Court recognized that the words 
`district court of the United States' are commonly used to 
describe Article III courts, the Court nevertheless held that 
in the context of the LMRA, that term was used to describe 
courts which exercise the jurisdiction of district courts. Id. 
at 241. 
 
In so holding, the Court relied on the legislative purpose 
of the LMRA. The Court found that Congress enacted the 
LMRA to eliminate obstacles to suits in federal courts. 
Furthermore, the Court relied on the fact that the LMRA 
"extends its full sweep to Alaska as well as to the states 
and the other territories. The trial court is indeed the only 
court in Alaska to which recourse could be had." Id. at 242. 
Recognizing that applying the LMRA to the District Court of 
Alaska does not give the words "district court of the United 
States" their literal and historic meaning, the Court 
nonetheless embraced this reading as effectuating the 
uniform, national policy and purpose of the LMRA. 
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As previously noted, the BAFJA was sweeping legislation 
enacted to establish a national bankruptcy system that 
includes the Virgin Islands. The BAFJA includes provisions 
relating to the territories and specifically provides for the 
appointment of bankruptcy judges to the territories if 
authorized by Congress. As sweeping legislation designed to 
establish a national bankruptcy system, the BAFJA is at 
least as broad as the LMRA at issue in Juneau Spruce. In 
addition, as with the LMRA, if general terms within the 
BAFJA such as "district court" and "judicial district" do not 
include the District Court of the Virgin Islands, there are 
circumstances under which no court within the Virgin 
Islands would be able to effectuate its general provisions.3 
 
Furthermore, the purpose of establishing a nationwide 
bankruptcy system is to alleviate the district courts of 
excessive workloads and to provide a system where judges 
with experience and expertise in bankruptcy matters can 
handle bankruptcy claims. In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 
1581 (2d Cir. 1983). In fact, in addition to revising the 
bankruptcy system, the BAFJA also created 85 new federal 
judgeships in order to "help alleviate the tremendous 
litigation backlogs in our courts." Collier on Bankruptcy, 
App. Vol. E, Pt. 6-146 (15th ed. 1997)(Statements from 
floor, 130 Cong. R. H. 7497). 
 
The temporary transfer provision in the BAFJA is 
analogous to the temporary transfer of district judges found 
at 28 U.S.C. S 291 (1994). Transfer provisions such as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The following example illustrates this point. Section 157 provides that 
"[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 . 
. . 
shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district." 28 U.S.C. 
S 157(a)(1994). Suppose that a bankruptcy judge was appointed to the 
Virgin Islands under section 152(a)(4) after authorization by Congress. If 
general terms in the BAFJA such as "district court" or "judicial district" 
were read to exclude the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
technically, 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands would never have the authority 
to refer bankruptcy cases pursuant to section 157(a) to a bankruptcy 
judge properly appointed under section 152(a)(4). In construing the 
BAFJA, we must presume that Congress did not intend this absurd 
result. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 
1994)(stating that "[i]t is the obligation of the court to construe a 
statute 
to avoid absurd results . . . ."). 
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these are to be used to "deal with an administrative 
problem" and are purely "ministerial". See Meeropol v. 
Nizer, 429 U.S. 1337, 1339 (1977)(discussing the nature of 
28 U.S.C. S 291). Generally, such provisions are properly 
used to assist a circuit with a heavy workload. Id. 
 
Given that Congress specifically included the Virgin 
Islands within the scope of the BAFJA, there is no rational 
reason for Congress to have intended to exclude the Virgin 
Islands from the transfer provision in the BAFJA and 
thereby preclude the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
from obtaining aid and specialized expertise in handling 
their bankruptcy caseload. Our construction of the terms 
"judicial district" and "district" as including the Virgin 
Islands therefore best effectuates the purpose and scope of 
the BAFJA generally and the transfer provision specifically. 
Accordingly, because the term "judicial district" must be 
read to include the Virgin Islands, section 155(a) grants the 
Third Circuit Judicial Council the authority to transfer a 
bankruptcy judge temporarily to serve in the Virgin Islands. 
 
II. 
 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the 
BAFJA affirmatively confers upon the Council the authority 
for a temporary transfer of a bankruptcy judge to the Virgin 
Islands. At a minimum, however, the BAFJA is silent on the 
Council's authority; the BAFJA contains no affirmative 
Congressional statement denying the Council the authority 
to transfer bankruptcy judges to the Virgin Islands. 
Because the BAFJA contains no such affirmative 
restriction, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
Council has the inherent authority to make such a transfer 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 332(d)(1994). 
 
III. 
 
I also agree with the majority's conclusion that regardless 
of the Council's authority to transfer temporarily a 
bankruptcy judge to the Virgin Islands under either the 
BAFJA or 28 U.S.C. S 332(d), Judge Cosetti's sanction 
orders are valid for the reasons the Court articulated in 
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992). In light of our 
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determination that both the BAFJA and 28 U.S.C.S 332(d) 
grant the Council the authority to make temporary transfer 
to the Virgin Islands, however, a specific determination on 
the validity of Judge Cosetti's sanction orders is 
unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. I write 
separately with regard to this point only to note that while 
I agree with the majority's conclusion on the independent 
validity of Judge Cosetti's sanction orders, I view this issue 
as secondary to our analysis of the Council's authority to 
make a temporary transfer and consider it to be merely a 
supplemental ground for our decision. 
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